



Of economics and statistics: the “Gerschenkron effect”

STEFANO FENOALTEA

Abstract:

The “Gerschenkron effect” refers to the purported biases of early-weighted and late-weighted indices of production. If production is properly measured in what economists mean by “real” terms, the “Gerschenkron effect” does not exist at all.

Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, Turin,
email: stefano.fenoaltea@unito.it

How to cite this article:

Fenoaltea S.: (2019), “Of economics and statistics: the “Gerschenkron effect””, *PSL Quarterly Review*, 72 (290): 195-205

DOI: https://doi.org/10.13133/2037-3643_72.290_2

JEL codes:

C19, C43, N00

Keywords:

Measurement, production, Gerschenkron effect

Journal homepage:

<http://www.pslquarterlyreview.info>

“Nothing is real...”

John Lennon and Paul McCartney, *Strawberry Fields Forever*

“The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function.”

F. Scott Fitzgerald, *The Crack-Up*

The “Gerschenkron effect” is the recognition that when intertemporal price and quantity relatives are negatively correlated an “early-weighted” aggregate will grow faster than a “late-weighted” aggregate (Gerschenkron, 1947). Empirically, that negative correlation is the norm, as the industries characterized by relatively rapid (slow) technical progress and a falling (rising) relative price benefit (suffer) from cost-reducing substitution.

The “Gerschenkron effect” is accordingly a staple of the index-number literature. At times, it is used to examine relative rates of technical change; most often, it is simply recalled to categorize “early-weighted” indices of production as “biased upward” (in the sense that they overstate the true growth rate) and “late-weighted” indices as symmetrically “biased downward” (e.g., Ames and Carlson, 1968, Jonas and Sardy, 1970, Crafts, 1985, Baffigi, 2013,



and references therein). Like other parts of our now customary intellectual baggage, it is taken as a given, and rarely, if at all, considered on its merits.

On its merits, the “Gerschenkron effect” would seem to be a statistical truism, indeed an arithmetic one. But not all arithmetic is “political arithmetick,” not all statistics are *economic* statistics (which is why we had a *Review of Economic Statistics*, the renaming of which is rich in sinister significance, Fenoaltea, 2019). As a matter of economics, the “Gerschenkron effect” does not stand up to scrutiny: it is the manifestation not of an aggregation or “index-number” problem, but simply of bad measurement.

I.

We hold these truths to be self-evident: that if $A = B$, $B = C$, and $C = D$, then $A = D$; and that the self-same glass of water may be worth anything from nothing at all to more than its weight in diamonds, depending on its relative scarcity. That the “Gerschenkron effect” is a snare and delusion follows directly; but let us proceed by easy steps.

Consider first the measurement of industries producing different goods, and of their joint product, at a single point in time. We measure the industries, and their products, in *value* terms (strictly speaking value *added*, but to avoid burdening the exposition let us assume that all raw materials are free). Specific considerations may warrant measuring the products along other dimensions (weight, for example, if these are supplies to be transported, or individual pieces, if these are animals to be housed in separate cages), but for general economic measurement we use price-weighted quantities; and we do this because prices (tend to) correspond at once to the cost of the goods (the opportunity benefit of the resources they absorb), and to the benefit they yield, in short to everything of interest to an economist. Quantities alone are of no concern: if one industry produces $2n$ cats and another n dogs, and each dog is worth two cats, we consider the two industries’ products equal, and the two industries themselves equal in size. Nothing changes, obviously, if we consider not two industries but four.

Imagine now, to reduce the problem to its barest essentials, that our four industries are those producing the same two goods, in two different time periods; that these two (two-period) industries are “small,” in the usual technical sense that whatever they may do or not do the economy-wide averages are unaffected; and that they are embedded in a “large” world with homogeneous labor, a stable wage and price level, and, in the large, a stable technology. As simplifications go, this assumption of overall stability is particularly powerful. It rids us not least of the problem of deflation: nominal values are *ipso facto* “real,” the intertemporal aspect is trivialized, and two industries in two periods are to all intents and purposes the equivalent of four industries in a single period. Let us set that aside, however, and carry on in the intertemporal context of the “Gerschenkron effect.”

Imagine finally that the two industries at hand are the deer-catching and beaver-catching industries; and assume that both of these employ only labor. We have it on good authority that if it usually costs twice the labor to kill a beaver which it does to kill a deer, one beaver should naturally exchange for or be worth two deer.

Assume that in the “early” period these two industries employ the same number of workers, at identical wages, and therefore have an identical value product: say 100 beaver at \$2 each, and 200 deer at \$1 each. Call the “early” beaver value product A , and the “early” deer

value product B : by assumption, $A = B$. Imagine that the deer-catching industry remains totally unchanged, so that in the “late” period it is still producing 200 deer at \$1 each, with (obviously, given the stable wage rate) the same number of workers as before. Call the “late” deer value product C : by assumption, $B = C$. Imagine that in the “late” period the beaver industry’s value product is again identical to that of the deer industry. Call the “late” beaver value product D : by assumption, $C = D$. It follows, self-evidently, that $A = D$: that the beaver-catching industry too has retained its original labor force, that, like the deer-catching industry, it has not grown at all.

It bears notice that this conclusion is reached without so much as mentioning the “late”-period beaver catch, or beaver-catching technology. Assume now that in the interval between our two periods workers have learned to imitate the beaver’s mating call, halving the (time) cost of catching them. In the “late” period a beaver is worth half as much as before in terms of deer, of all other goods, and of paper money too. Beaver too are now worth \$1 each: the industry’s work force and value product (at the unchanged price level) are by assumption unchanged, its physical product has doubled to 200 beaver.

Enter the “Gerschenkron effect.” At “early” prices, the product of the two industries together grows from \$200 of beaver and \$200 of deer to \$400 of beaver and \$200 of deer, or, overall, by one-half; at “late” prices, from \$100 of beaver and \$200 of deer to \$200 of beaver and \$200 of deer, or, overall, by one-third. Given the negative correlation of relative-quantity and relative-price movements, the faster growth of the “early” price-weighted aggregate is as inevitable as death and taxes – and as illuminating. The growth of these industries’ aggregate real product – their aggregate value product at an unchanging price *level* – is by construction zero: both the base-year-price-weighted quantity indices overstate it, both display an *upward* bias, the “late-weighted” index as well as (though not as much as) the “early-weighted” one.

Obviously, too, the root problem is not an “index-number” problem at all, for the mismeasurement is logically prior to the combination of the two product series into a single aggregate. The error is entirely internal to the measurement of the product of the technologically progressive industry, in this case the beaver-catching industry; and it is specifically in the measurement of the growth of its real (value) product by that of its physical product. Its real product did not increase at all; its physical product doubled, but the mere number of beaver caught is as intrinsically irrelevant to our measure in this (ostensibly) intertemporal context as the mere numbers of cats and dogs in the (explicitly) intratemporal example above. To assume productivity growth only in the beaver-catching industry is to assume a reduction in beavers’ relative scarcity, in their cost, in their benefits, in short in their real value: productivity growth in that one industry means that the increase in its physical output overstates the increase in production, in the size of the industry itself. The problem is in that *one* series, the games one can play when adding it to another merely confuse the issue.

Technical progress transforms water-in-the-desert, worth its weight in diamonds, into tap-water worth nothing at all: the two may have the same chemistry, but their relative scarcities are very different. It follows, self-evidently, that they are not the same *economic* thing: like cats and dogs, they must be counted using appropriately different price weights.

II.

To an economist, all this is obvious, and intuitively appealing: or perhaps it should be, but is not. If it is not, one suspects, it is because the specialized understanding of the import of the water-diamonds paradox clashes with the general understanding that physical things are indeed real: on the basis of the latter, surely, one is not inclined to accept the above distinction between the industry's real product and its physical product, or the above claim that in the presence of (industry-specific) technical progress the growth of the latter exceeds that of the former.

The attendant difficulty seems itself to have very deep roots, in the very nature of the social sciences, and of language. The "hard" (real?) sciences deal with concepts beyond our general understanding: to the rest of us a boson may conjure up some extinct herbivore, but to a physicist the term is presumably unambiguous, uncontaminated by a different meaning in ordinary discourse. Not so the social sciences in general, and economics in particular: because we deal with the stuff of ordinary life we use ordinary words, but as we refine our concepts those words acquire technical meanings that often differ from their ordinary ones (thus for example "rent," or more dramatically "marginal," which conveys to an economist the opposite of what it conveys to the ordinary copy-editor).

In ordinary discourse "real" means "thing-like," things are real by definition. But as a part of economics' technical language "real" is used metaphorically rather than literally, it means "thing-like" only in specific circumstances. The proof is in the antonym, which is not "unreal," but "nominal."

The distinction between "real" and "nominal" emerged of course in the context of inflation, where the first-order change was the rise in the price *level*, and all other changes were altogether secondary: in economics "real" means not generally "like things" but specifically "like things when the currency loses its value in exchange, and things do not." In that context things are "real," in the technical sense, not because they are things but because they can be converted into a constant quantity of goods in general, and for that matter of labor.

Set labor aside, for now, and consider only the conversion into goods in general. In the case of inflation, everything – every thing – is "real" (maintains its value in exchange), save paper money; with no inflation, and technical progress only in our "small" beaver-catching industry, paper money is "real," and all things are "real" *except beaver*. We know this: one would have been better advised, ten years ago, to hoard cash than to hoard computer memory cards. As a general proposition, in the presence of technical progress things are obviously real in the colloquial sense, and as obviously *not* "real" in the technical sense of the term. *Strawberry fields*, with a perception perhaps artificially enhanced, got it right; Alexander Gerschenkron got it wrong.

And so, in fact, did the general literature on "real" value added, led astray by the non-technical meaning of the word, by the sense that "real" meant somehow directly in industry-specific things rather than in goods-in-general (Fenoaltea, 1976, 2015, Fuà, 1993). In this case (and in contrast, say, to that of "rent"), the metaphorical meaning failed to acquire an adequate psychological distance from the literal one, and in the event the weight of the latter proved overwhelming. Solomon Fabricant and Robert Geary measured "real" value added as a difference between base-year-price-weighted physical quantities, perplexingly producing sometimes negative results; Paul David reacted by suggesting own-output-price deflation,

which avoids negative results at the cost of violating the first condition required of any measure of aggregate value added, that it be invariant to (vertical) disaggregation; Kenneth Arrow and Christopher Sims went so far as to argue that “real value added” does not even exist unless the production function is suitably separable (Fabricant, 1940, Geary, 1944, David, 1966, Sims, 1969, Arrow, 1974, on which see Fenoaltea, 1976). These names include something of a pantheon: that even such minds may have been misled is a testimony to the power of words, to their capacity to constrain thought, to give the irrelevant the appearance of relevance – but of that, Deirdre McCloskey warned us long ago (McCloskey, 1983).

III.

Some concluding remarks may be in order.

One concerns the links between products and resources. In equilibrium, value added in the production of a good equals the value of the primary resources it consumes. The fable above tells the story of physical goods that are not real because they happen to depreciate, relative to goods in general. An alternative fable about a “small” industry in a stable “large” economy could eliminate technical change altogether, and tell of a change in fashion that increases the demand for beaver. Assume that beaver-hunters are a specialized resource, that their number is given, that the supply of beaver is perfectly inelastic: physical product (the number of beaver caught) is unchanged, but the relative price of beaver rises, and so does the relative wage of beaver-hunters. The industry’s real product grows because its unchanged physical product is now more scarce than before; the industry becomes larger because the unchanged physical resources it consumes have similarly become more scarce. Technical progress turns water-in-the-desert into tap-water, demand growth does the opposite: physical resources are no more “real” than physical goods.

Another concerns industry-specific technical progress. Normally, it would seem, technical progress saves primary resources, as in our beaver-catching fable above: it reduces value added (at given unit resource costs) per unit of physical product, so that the growth of the latter exceeds the growth of the industry’s real value product and of the industry itself. In this case, the above fable stands as told. If technical progress merely saves raw materials, value added per unit of output is unchanged, and the growth of the industry’s physical product can double as a measure of its real growth. If technical progress saves raw materials at the cost of a greater consumption of primary resources (all per unit of output) the point of the fable is made *a contrario*: the growth of physical product *understates* the growth of the industry, and of its value added (at given unit resource costs). But the point of the fable is that physical product movements are a poor measure of real production movements, the way the price of Maine potatoes is a poor index of consumer prices even if under certain conditions it produces the appropriate number; and that point stands.

A third considers economy-wide technical progress. The above fable assumes it away: beaver depreciate (relative to goods in general) because industry-specific productivity growth exceeds zero. But if “real” means “converted to goods in general” the relative price of the product falls only if industry-specific productivity growth exceeds the average (and *increases* in the opposite case); and in our own fortunate era that average is well above zero. Amend the above fable to assume that productivity, on average, doubled; assume again a constant price

level, and have the wage (therefore) also double. The (nominal and real) value of beaver therefore remains constant, at \$2: the "late" period catch is 200 beaver, for a total of \$400. Deer, produced by the "small" exceptional industry with stagnant productivity, double in value to \$2, for a total of \$400 (again assuming perfectly inelastic supply). The combined real product doubles, from \$400 to \$800 (as does the real wage bill, with a doubled real wage and an unchanged labor force). The base-year-price-weighted quantity indices grow from \$400 to \$600 at "early" prices and from \$600 to \$800 at "late" prices: both understate aggregate real product growth, both display a *downward* bias, the "early-weighted" index as well as (though not as much as) the "late-weighted" one. If the assumptions built into the initial fable are reversed, so too, symmetrically, are its conclusions.

A fourth considers the "real" value of labor; to avoid clutter, let us again think of it as homogeneous. Historically, of course, the primary social concern that motivated the distinction between "real" and "nominal" values was that with the "real wage," that is, the value of labor in terms of goods-in-general: the concern that inflation might hurt the poorer members of society, that in the short run sticky wages might lag behind prices. In the long run, of course, wages are no more sticky than prices are; and that social concern is replaced by a theoretical one, in the context not of inflation but of the *diffuse* technical progress considered above. As noted, the latter means that the "real wage" tends to rise, that labor becomes ever more valuable in terms of goods, or, if we prefer, that goods become ever *less* valuable in terms of labor.

Our concern with the social effects of inflation has assigned to "real" the meaning of "converted into goods in general": the implication is that goods-in-general conserve their "real value," as labor and individual goods do not. But two comments are here in order. First, we have it again on good authority that as *all* goods become more abundant they are collectively, as well as individually, worth less. Diminishing marginal utility is here enough; catastrophically diminishing utility is implied if goods become increasingly positional goods, a matter of keeping up with the Joneses, or, for what it may be worth, by the "Easterlin Paradox" (Easterlin, 1974, of moot empirical content, for asking people if they are happy is like asking them if they are tall or healthy: the response is inevitably a distribution around what is perceived as average, simply because words serve to draw distinctions, and their "real" content changes to maintain their usefulness). Second, we have it again on good authority that the real value of a good is the quantity not of other goods, but of labor, that it can purchase or command; and all authority aside the strength of that intuition is obvious from the historical literature, as authors uniformly convey a sense of the period's monetary values by indicating not the prices of goods but the typical wage rate.

The bottom line is that over time, as across space, labor and goods-in-general cannot both be "real." Measurement in the one and measurement in the other differ, over time, by the increase in the real wage. The choice is arbitrary, the inevitable ambiguity irritating but not debilitating; in terms of the above parables it simply means that our measures are identified up to a limited rotation of the axes.

Appendix 1: the definitions

At current prices, production $VA_1 = va_{11}Q_{11} + va_{12}Q_{12}$ in period 1 and $VA_2 = va_{21}Q_{21} + va_{22}Q_{22}$ in period 2, where va_{ij} and Q_{ij} refer respectively to unit value added, and physical product, in period i by industry j .

The “early”-price-weighted quantity measure of total product is $VA_{11} = va_{11}Q_{11} + va_{12}Q_{12}$ ($= VA_1$) in period 1 and $VA_{12} = va_{11}Q_{21} + va_{12}Q_{22}$ in period 2.

The “late”-price-weighted quantity measure of total product is $VA_{21} = va_{21}Q_{11} + va_{22}Q_{12}$ in period 1 and $VA_{22} = va_{21}Q_{21} + va_{22}Q_{22}$ ($= VA_2$) in period 2.

The measure of total product converted into goods in general is VA_1 / p_1 in period 1 and VA_2 / p_2 in period 2, where p is the overall price index.

The measure of total product converted into labor is VA_1 / w_1 in period 1 and VA_2 / w_2 in period 2, where w is the wage index.

The alternative product indices are the ratios of the various period-2 measures to the corresponding period-1 measures, normalized to 100 in period 1.

Appendix 2: an illustration

An illustration is readily obtained from the estimates for the general engineering industry in post-Unification Italy (Fenoaltea, 2015), as these serendipitously distinguish new production, marked by significant productivity growth, and maintenance, which remained a hand process and was to all intents and purposes technologically stagnant.

The value-added-weighted quantity series yield estimates, at 1911 prices, of 355 million lire in new production and 240 million lire in maintenance in 1911, and 34 and 150 million lire, respectively, in 1871; setting 1871 = 100, the aggregate in 1911 equals 323. This last figure corresponds to the relative growth in the new-production quantity ($355/34$) plus the relative growth in the maintenance quantity ($240/150$), weighted by their shares of the aggregate, at 1911 prices, in 1871: $(355/34) \cdot (34/(34+150)) + (240/150) \cdot (150/(34+150)) = (10.4 \cdot .185) + (1.60 \cdot .815) = 3.23$. At current prices, in 1871, new production and maintenance accounted for an estimated 45 and 55 percent, respectively, of the total: at 1871 prices the (“early”) weighted-quantity growth becomes $(10.4 \cdot .450) + (1.60 \cdot .550) = 5.56$, or 1.7 times the figure obtained at (“late”) 1911 prices: the “Gerschenkron effect,” as expected.

Let us take “real” to mean converted into (unskilled) labor. The growth in maintenance, the technologically stagnant hand process, measured at 1911 prices is “real” growth: using the available estimates of the corresponding (unskilled) industrial wage rate in 1911 (2.923 lire per day, Fenoaltea, 2011, p. 125), “real maintenance” grew from 150 million/2.923 = 51.3 million days’ labor in 1871 to 240 million/2.923 = 82.1 million days’ labor in 1911.

In 1911, new production is equivalent to 355 million/2.923 = 121.5 million days’ labor. In 1871, new production is estimated at $(45/55)$ times maintenance, at current prices; with maintenance then equivalent to 51.3 million days’ labor, new production was the equivalent of $(45/55) \cdot 51.3 = 42.0$ million days’ labor: the “real” relative growth of new production from 1871 to 1911 is $121.5/42.0 = 2.89$, far below the $355/34 = 10.4$ figure obtained from the product-quantity series. By the same token, at 1911 wages the new production of the engineering industry in 1871 works out to 355 million lire/2.89, or 123 million lire.

The increase in the industry's aggregate real (labor-equivalent) product from 1871 to 1911 is accordingly, at 1911 wages, from $(123 + 150) = 273$ million lire to $(355 + 240) = 595$ million lire, for a relative increase of $(595/273) = 2.18$. In 1871, the corresponding wage equaled 1.544 lire. At 1871 wages, new production and maintenance equaled in 1871 $(42.0 \text{ million} \cdot 1.544 \text{ lire}) = 64.8$ million lire and $(51.3 \text{ million} \cdot 1.544 \text{ lire}) = 79.2$ million lire, respectively, for a total of 144.0 million lire, and, in 1911, $(121.5 \text{ million} \cdot 1.544 \text{ lire}) = 187.6$ million lire and $(82.1 \text{ million} \cdot 1.544 \text{ lire}) = 126.8$ million lire, for a total of 314.4 million lire; the relative increase equals $(314.4/144.0) = 2.18$, as before, with logical inevitability (as the only change is in the wage rates which finally cancel).

Because the relative growth of the progressive sector is measured not by the quantity of its output (which increased by a factor of 10.4), but by its "real" equivalent (which increased by a factor of 2.89), the shares of the two sectors in 1871 obtained by working back from 1911 correspond exactly to their shares at current prices – $(355/2.89)/(240/1.60) = (45/55)$ – as do those for 1911 obtained by working forward from 1871 – $(45 \cdot 2.89)/(55 \cdot 1.6) = (355/240)$: the "Gerschenkron effect" is nowhere to be seen.

Let us take "real" to mean converted into goods-in-general, or more specifically wage goods, those entering the calculated real wage for (again unskilled) industrial workers (Fenoaltea, 2011, p. 125, as before). The above calculations are modified only by converting the labor-days considered above to such goods, using the calculated daily real wage equal to 1.389 lire in 1871 and 2.966 in 1911. Since the real-wage growth from 100 to 214 is applied equally to the days'-labor equivalent in both new production and maintenance, the just-noted equivalence of their shares at current prices and their calculated shares at base-year prices remains, and the "Gerschenkron effect" is again absent. What changes is that the calculated "real growth" of the industry is inflated: for the aggregate, for example, setting 1871 = 100, one obtains for 1911 an index of 218 with the "labor" standard, as calculated above, and of $(218 \cdot 2.14) = 467$ with this "goods" standard: This is the difference that illustrates the real ambiguity of "real" measures, so to speak, and it has nothing to do with the "Gerschenkron effect."

Appendix 3: the "Gerschenkron effect" in historical perspective

The "Gerschenkron effect" dates from the 1940s, the same Dark Ages of economic measurement that spawned the Fabricant-Geary "double-deflated" measure of "real value added"; the *curiosum* considered here is that these contemporaries appear never to have met.

The background may be summarized as follows. At current prices, the value added of industry i (VA_i) is measured as $VA_i = p_i Q_i - z_i R_i$, where p and z are the prices, and Q and R the quantities, of the product and the raw material, respectively, or, equivalently, $VA_i = w_i L_i + r_i K_i$, where w and r are the prices, and L and K the quantities, of the primary factors of production, workers and machinery; as every economist should immediately realize, w and r are both spot-market rental rates, which imply zero profits even in the short run (Fenoaltea, 1976).

Fabricant and Geary measured the "real value added" of industry i in year t (RVA_{it}) as $RVA_{it} = p_b Q_{it} - z_b R_{it}$, where p_b and z_b are the output and raw material prices of the "base" year. Had they (and the profession which accepted their measure) had the *nous* to recognize the above equivalence, it would have been immediately apparent that with their approach "real value added" could also be measured as $RVA_{it} = w_b L_i + r_b K_i$, where w_b and r_b are the (rental)

prices of workers and machinery in the same “base” year. That these alternative measures of the same thing with the same approach did *not* in general coincide might have been enough to reveal the absurdity of their approach, and send them (and the profession) back to the drawing board; but that was not to be.

The absurdity of the Fabricant-Geary measure came to the profession’s attention in a different way, with the above-noted discovery that $RVA_{it} = p_b Q_i - z_b R_{it}$ is not even necessarily non-negative. Predictably so: at any point in time the output and input prices are related, and reflect the input-output ratio R/Q . Materials-saving technical progress reduces the input-output ratio, and (normally, i.e., if labor and machinery are elastically supplied) narrows the gap between p and zRQ ; calculating “real value added” with the low-gap “late” prices and the “early,” high R/Q readily produces (nonsensically) low, possibly negative results. Calculating “real value added” with the high-gap “early” prices and the “late,” low R/Q instead yields only high, positive results (which are still nonsense, because the measure recognizes the effect of technical change on relative quantities but not on relative prices, but not *obvious* nonsense).

Imagine a Fabricant-Geary measure of the growth of a manufacturing sector composed of just two industries (Table A). Industry 1 (“linen”) is technically stagnant, and does not grow; imagine that $p_{10} = p_{11} = 20$, $Q_{10} = Q_{11} = 20$, $z_{10} = z_{11} = 6$, and $R_{10} = R_{11} = 25$. “Early” and “late” prices and quantities are the same, with either base the Fabricant-Geary measure of “real value added” equals $((20 \cdot 20) - (6 \cdot 25)) = 250$ in both years. Industry 2 (“steel”) is characterized by materials-saving (fuel-saving) technical progress, a falling relative price, and output growth. It requires greater complexity: imagine that $p_{20} = 100$ and $p_{21} = 30$, $Q_{20} = 20$ and $Q_{21} = 120$, $z_{20} = 20$ and $z_{21} = 20$, and $R_{20} = 40$ and $R_{21} = 80$. Its current-price value added equals $((100 \cdot 20) - (20 \cdot 40)) = 1200$ in year 0, and $((30 \cdot 120) - (20 \cdot 80)) = 2000$ in year 1. With “early” base prices its Fabricant-Geary “real value added” in period 1 equals $((100 \cdot 120) - (20 \cdot 80)) = 10400$, so that aggregate manufacturing grows from $(250 + 1200) = 1450$ in period 0 to $(250 + 10400) = 10650$ in period 1; setting the aggregate in period 0 to 100, in period 1 it equals a heady 734. With “late” base prices its Fabricant-Geary “real value added” in period 0 equals $((30 \cdot 20) - (20 \cdot 40)) = -200$, so that aggregate manufacturing grows from $(250 - 200) = 50$ in period 0 to $(250 + 2000) = 2250$ in period 1; setting the aggregate in period 0 to 100, in period 1 it equals a much headier 4500. *Output prices and quantities are negatively correlated, but the “late-weighted” index nonetheless grows faster than the “early-weighted” index.* Gerschenkron, meet Fabricant and Geary; Fabricant, Geary, meet Gerschenkron.

This result is not inevitable, of course; if one repeats the exercise with a fivefold increase in p_{1t} and z_{1t} ($p_{1t} = 100$, $z_{1t} = 30$), the “early-weighted” aggregate grows from 100 to 476, the “late weighted” aggregate from 100 only to 310. But it is possible; and that suffices to establish that the “Gerschenkron effect” and the Fabricant-Geary measure of “real value added” may be mutually contradictory.

That two errors may contradict each other is as noted no more than a *curiosum* in the history of thought. It is worth mentioning, if at all, because a surprising (not to say depressing) number of economists still appear to believe at once, and very firmly, in both the “Gerschenkron effect” and the Fabricant-Geary measure of “real value added.” If they retain the ability to function, and F. Scott Fitzgerald got it right, they are economists of first-rate intelligence.

Table A1 – *The growth of a hypothetical two-industry manufacturing sector: Fabricant-Geary measures*

	Industry 1 ("linen")	Industry 2 ("steel")
<i>Period 0 (current prices)</i>		
Output price (p)	20	100
Output quantity (Q)	20	20
Sales (pQ)	400	2000
Materials price (z)	6	20
Materials quantity (R)	25	40
Materials cost (zR)	150	800
Value added ($pQ - zR$)	250	1200
<i>Period 1 (current prices)</i>		
Output price (p)	20	30
Output quantity (Q)	20	120
Sales (pQ)	400	3600
Materials price (z)	6	20
Materials quantity (R)	25	80
Materials cost (zR)	150	1600
Value added ($pQ - zR$)	250	2000
<i>Fabricant-Geary "real value added"</i>		
Period 1 at period 0 prices:	$(20 \cdot 20) - (6 \cdot 25)$ = 250	$(100 \cdot 120) - (20 \cdot 80)$ = 10400
Period 0 at period 1 prices:	$(20 \cdot 20) - (6 \cdot 25)$ = 250	$(30 \cdot 20) - (20 \cdot 40)$ = -200
Period 1 aggregate index at "early" prices (period 0 = 100): $100 (250+10400)/(250+1200) = 734$		
Period 1 aggregate index at "late" prices (period 0 = 100): $100 (250+2000)/(250-200) = 4500$		

References

- Ames E. and Carlson J.A. (1968), "Production Index Bias as a Measure of Economic Development", *Oxford Economic Papers*, 20 (1), pp. 24-37.
- Arrow K.J. (1974), "The Measurement of Real Value Added", in David P.A. and Reder M.W. (eds.), *Nations and Households in Economic Growth: Essays in Honor of Moses Abramowitz* (pp. 3-20), New York: Academic Press.
- Baffigi A. (2013), "National Accounts, 1861-2011", in Toniolo G. (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Italian Economy since Unification* (pp. 157-186), New York: Oxford University Press.
- Crafts N.A. (1985), *British Economic Growth During the Industrial Revolution*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- David P.A. (1966), "Measuring Real Net Output: A Proposed Index", *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 48 (4), pp. 419-425.
- Easterlin R.A. (1974), "Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evidence", in David P. A. and Reder M. W. (eds.), *Nations and Households in Economic Growth: Essays in Honor of Moses Abramowitz* (pp. 89-125), New York: Academic Press.

- Fabricant S. (1940), *The Output of Manufacturing Industries, 1899-1937*, New York: National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Fenoaltea S. (1976), "Real Value Added and the Measurement of Industrial Production", *Annals of Economic and Social Measurement*, 5 (1), pp. 111-137; available at: <https://www.nber.org/chapters/c10430.pdf>.
- Fenoaltea S. (2011), *The Reinterpretation of Italian Economic History: from Unification to the Great War*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Fenoaltea S. (2015), "The Measurement of Production Movements: Lessons from the General Engineering Industry in Italy, 1861-1913", *Explorations in Economic History*, 57, pp. 19-37.
- Fenoaltea S. (2019), "Spleen: The Failures of the Cliometric School", *Annals of the Fondazione Luigi Einaudi*, 53 (forthcoming).
- Fuà G. (1993), *Crescita economica. Le insidie delle cifre*, Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Geary R.C. (1944), "The Concept of Net Volume of Output, with Special Reference to Irish Data", *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, n.s., 107 (3/4), pp. 251-261.
- Gerschenkron A. (1947), "The Soviet Indices of Industrial Production", *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 29 (4), pp. 217-226.
- Jonas P. and Sardy H. (1970), "The Gerschenkron Effect: A Re-examination", *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 52 (1), pp. 82-86.
- McCloskey D.N. (1983), "The Rhetoric of Economics", *Journal of Economic Literature*, 21 (2), pp. 481-517.
- Sims C.A. (1969), "Theoretical Basis for a Double Deflated Index of Real Value Added", *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 51 (4), pp. 470-471.

© 2019. This work is licensed under
<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0> (the “License”).
Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this
content in accordance with the terms of the License.